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I propose in these remarks to relate education to freedom by pointing to three basic 
experiences in the history of education and by drawing some conclusions from them. 
I start, of course, from the premise that without freedom, no education is possib-
le. And let me deﬁne „education“, somewhat brutally, as the activity of sustaining, 
extending and transmitting the culture of a civilisation. These three activities, of 
course, cannot be clearly distinguished: each involves the other. 
The ﬁrst moral and social philosopher was Socrates, who drew on a tradition 
that owed much to earlier thinkers, called, signiﬁcantly „pre-Socratics.“ Socrates 
promoted a bracing scepticism about both gods and majorities, and the Athenian 
democracy put him to death for it in 399 BC. Those early dialogues in which Pla-
to represented Socrates are in themselves an excellent education in the logic of 
inquiry. In particular, Socrates insisted on demanding clarity about the object of 
discussion as the precondition for advancing understanding. In Socratic thought, 
philosophy consisted in a critical examination of the ideas we all use in making 
sense of the world we live in. It was a crucial element in this inquiry that we ought 
not to be impressed by the fact that everybody accepts the belief being examined. 
Truth was not a matter of counting votes. The enormous signiﬁcance of Socra-
tes is that his life and his teaching united to make him not only an exemplar but 
virtually a martyr in the cause of knowledge. His submission to the verdict of the 
Athenian people (rather than taking the opportunity to run away from Athens) 
was itself based on a point of logic - namely, that the very life one leads implies 
a principle of conduct. To belong entails submitting to the law.
In the Socratic image of education, the philosopher stands apart from both 
the state and society, and represents a critical tradition that may well ﬁnd itself 
in conﬂict with the „conventional wisdom.“ The philosopher, as the lover of wis-
dom, is a creature of questions rather than answers. And that means that his use 
to practical men - to rulers in particular - is marginal. Practical men have urgent 
problems to which some sort of answer must be found, and soon. The philoso-
pher, by contrast, is in no hurry to arrive at a conclusion, and if he does, he soon 
ﬁnds that conclusions generate as many problems as they solve. The conclusion I 
draw is that the philosopher will always ﬁnd himself in opposition to the practical 
man, and that education must keep its distance from chancelleries. Indeed, phi-
losophers may not merely be useless in practice; they may actually be dangerous 
if they undermine the convictions on which the city is based. 
Education, then, may well be at odds with conventional opinion, but it is far 
from true that mere oppositionality is a sign of philosophical thought. In any so-
ciety (especially in modern times) governments will ﬁnd themselves opposed by 
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many ideas and practices; some of these may be educational, but many will not. 
The terrorist and the criminal - not to mention the student militants of the 1960s 
- were all oppositional, but they certainly were not concerned with that „disinte-
rested pursuit of truth“ that has classically been cultivated in universities. I ﬁnd 
it easy to understand why many academics, especially philosophers, have argued 
that universities are essentially critical institutions, but this is an idea that must 
be treated with caution. For one thing, any transposition of a living tradition into 
an abstract idea will be inadequate to it. For another, every dogma is critical of 
something, but rejection is not the same as criticism. As against this identiﬁca-
tion of the academic in terms of an essence, I should prefer to advance my central 
theme, which is that education is essentially in conﬂict with practice. 
Let me now move to my second basic experience: the founding of European 
universities in the course of the twelfth century. The marvellous thing about these 
associations was that they seem to have emerged spontaneously from a passion 
to explore ideas based upon classical and Christian texts. The ﬁrst teachers whose 
work developed into what came to be called the studia generalia of the middle 
ages were of course Christians, but they were Christians many of whom thought 
that their religion needing the bracing clariﬁcations of dialectic. An accretion of 
merely received ideas had left Christianity in a condition of incoherence. Here 
education was needed as a kind of hygienic resuscitation of otherwise confused 
doctrine. Further, they wanted to understand better what their faith revealed about 
the world, and this involved them in the same kind of philosophical inquiry as 
Socrates had initiated. What did the words of their creed actually mean? And in 
pursuing this theme, one of the resources available to them was the literature of 
Greece and Rome whose high prestige made all the more teasing the fact that it 
assumed both a religion and a way of life quite different from the realities of the 
life around them. Before long, the Scholastics were launched on dangerous ideas 
about the reality of universals, ideas that made the custodians of orthodoxy un-
easy. Authority took rapid steps to bring this new movement into the established 
fold. Corporations of teachers who had come together ex consuetudine - by cus-
tom - were rapidly assimilated to Papal or Imperial decree. Universities required 
Papal or Imperial charter - but the reality was that the ﬂowering of culture in 
these times was part of the new explosion of associative tendencies possible in 
a society of individuals governed by the rule of law. It is the beginnings of what 
later came to be called „civil society.“
The essence of civil society is that it arises spontaneously within a framework 
of law, but independently of the purposes of civil authority. The cultivation and 
transmission of knowledge by these enthusiastic teachers was able to exploit the 
autonomy a Christian civilisation gives to religious activity, and it beneﬁted from 
the alms-giving propensities of the pious of those days. Colleges could thus be-
come well-endowed institutions largely able to govern themselves without serious 
interference from civil authority. Further, being (so to speak) international orga-
nisations, they were in some degree independent of authorities. (The generale in 
studium generale signiﬁed open to all comers.)
Some will object to my argument that my rather Ivory Tower view of universities 
fails to recognise the fact that these new institutions served the practical needs 
of society at a time when both the Church and the towns were demanding clerks 
capable of administering ever more complex activities. No doubt this is true - some 
response to practical needs is hard to avoid - but the vital thing is that universities 
as they emerged developed their own highly distinctive character and purposes, 
things which distinguished them from mere training colleges for practical needs.
Others may well object that growing up within the context of religion, me-
diaeval universities were shackled by orthodoxy and lacked the freedom to follow 
the argument wherever it might lead. Many modern scholars recognise a basic 
conﬂict between the university and the Church, whose doctrines have often func-
tioned oppressively. It is certainly true that scholars of that time needed to keep a 
wary eye on the problem of heresy, and Abelard himself, who might well feature 
as the heroic exemplar of this stage of academic development (corresponding to 
Socrates) was condemned by two Councils of the Church and had to burn his ﬁrst 
writings. Nonetheless, religion raises many of the questions to which the metaphy-
sician and the physicist also respond, and it is difﬁcult to see how the academic 
tradition could emerge from any other background. (It seems it never has). Further, 
the institutional features of universities unmistakably descend from the monastic 
tradition. The basic point, of course, is that no one can reliably predict when some 
academic point - a philosophical doctrine, an anthropological generalisation, an 
archaeological discovery - may be judged threatening to one or other of the domi-
nant powers in a society. The totalitarian states of the twentieth century were no 
less dangerous to academic inquiry than the Christians of the later Inquisition had 
been. The world is irredeemably a dangerous place, even at times, for the mouse-
like scholar who only wants to be left alone. 
My third paradigm is the emergence of modern experimental science, and here 
it is less easy to ﬁt an exemplar to a paradigm, but we might well select Galileo 
Galilei as a forerunner of Harvey, Newton, Lavoisier, Helmholz, Einstein and many 
later ﬁgures. Galileo was an all-purpose polymath fascinated by how the natural 
world worked. His science persuaded him that Copernican heliocentricity was the 
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truth about cosmology, and he actually said it. He thus late in life had to face the 
Inquisition, and submit his opinion to Cardinals little less sophisticated than him-
self. The problem resolved itself into the distinction between the hypothetical and 
the real, and in the famous (and apparently true) story, Galileo in submitting to the 
Inquisition was heard to mutter: and yet, it moves! Here we have a type of event 
that has been played out many times again in the history of science, down to the 
rumpus over evolution and much else. There are always cherished, or prudent or 
perhaps even merely comfortable beliefs, that seek protection against what they 
imagine to be the threatening character of some academic argument.  
Here then we have a case in which the logic in terms of which Europeans were 
understanding the world was scientiﬁc rather than philosophical. But in philosophy 
as in science, the point is to explain and understand the world, not to change or 
improve it, and that is why it is part of the tradition I am identifying with educa-
tion. And if we had attended to later intellectual developments, we would have 
been able to recognise the achievement of historians and archaeologists in bringing 
back to life the experiences of people long dead and largely forgotten. We might, 
alternatively, have taken notice of the scholarship concerning old manuscripts, li-
terary masterpieces, sacred texts and other such interests cultivated in universities 
and transforming, as they develop, the way in which the young are introduced to 
our civilisation. We might have mentioned logic and mathematics as part of the 
way in which the vast scope of human knowledge has ramiﬁed and become the 
preserve of many cooperating specialists, all recognising what a university is, its 
character as the bearer of tradition, the collegial character that does not modify 
its international aspects and the many devices it has developed in order to sustain 
its activities over the centuries. Our academic civilisation is literate and open to 
all human beings. Our technology is such that we have long transcended the old 
monopolies that protected craft secrets against others. Today, virtually any tech-
nology that attracts those in other civilisations is open to imitation by anyone, 
though its complexity might well be such that it requires enormous intellectual 
sophistication and resources of wealth to do it. An open society has created, for 
better or for worse, an open civilisation. What I am in this paper calling „educa-
tion“ is an immense success, so successful, indeed, that sociologists often under-
stand the university as the cognitive powerhouse of our civilisation. In doing so, 
they completely misunderstand its character as education. 
Let me now consider what may be learned from these episodes about the re-
alities of the educational tradition. I want to argue on the basis of my understan-
ding of the university tradition that what I am taking to be education is always 
potentially in conﬂict with other interests and institutions in society. Above all, 
academic inquiry will often ﬁnd itself in conﬂict with practice. In practical life, 
both individually and collectively, we seek to achieve satisfactions and achieve our 
ends, but in education (except in an inescapable and trivial sense) there are no 
ends and satisfactions to be pursued. The dream of practice is a society in which 
all power has been so successfully mobilised that we are all happy and satisﬁed, 
while the reality of human life is that satisfactions have costs, and that they con-
ﬂict with one another, as do the ends we all seek. I am presenting, then, a con-
ﬂict view of Western society, and in the academic world, the conﬂicts are easy to 
illustrate. For example, academic argument has often been in conﬂict with the 
dogmas of churches. A particularly vibrant current example is the conﬂict between 
Creationists and Darwinians in the United States at the present moment. Again, 
nationalists seek to entrench historical legends in our politics, while racists have 
beliefs about genetic determination that have seldom survived academic criti-
cism. Certain kinds of moral absolute are vulnerable to criticism by anthropolo-
gists and historians. We might indeed take this conﬂict to be symbolised by the 
classical education that so long dominated European thought, in which young 
people living in our Christian world were imaginatively drawn to live amid the 
vanished thoughts and creations of the Greeks and the Romans. The imaginative 
life of Europeans has always been in high degree, alienated. And one result of 
this, making Europeans unique as civilisations, is the interest we have also taken 
in the way other peoples live. 
Let me make two comments on this conflict between education and 
practice. 
The ﬁrst is to say that the way practice operates, its dynamic power to sub-
ordinate the free play of the intellect to the narrow demands of policy, is in our 
time based on rationalist ideas. That is to say, practical people criticise historical 
institutions because they are thought to be inefﬁcient in performing some essential 
function that may be plausibly ascribed to the institution. Any functional theory of 
a real existing institution will certainly discover that it is deﬁcient because the real 
never corresponds to a concept. Universities are not, argues one typical rationalist 
critic, mobilising their immense intellectual power to the solving of pressing social 
problems. And what are the universities doing to advance national prosperity? The 
drive of practice is to maximise power and to direct it to generating satisfactions. 
The result of this approach is that we become confused because we come to think 
of education in terms of two distinct vocabularies, one concerned with reﬂection, 
the other concerned with power.
The educational activity of scholarship, says the rationalist, is really just a rather 
useless form of „research.“ What is the point of theory that brings no beneﬁts to 
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others? And education itself, adds the rationalist, is really the practice of inculca-
ting things called „skills“ into the young. A „skill“ is a practice that can generate 
a guaranteed and predictable outcome, and is thus distinct from education which 
certainly changes individuals, but not in ways that can be predicted and reliably 
used. Even the old ambition of extracting useful lessons for statesmen from the 
study of history, with its tired utilitarian aspirations, is another dream of the eager 
rationalist.  As Hegel remarked, the only lesson you can get from history is that 
there are no lessons from history. He did, however, go on to create a philosophy 
of history that did give a meaning to the course of human history.
What society needs, says the rationalist, is training in the skills that allow 
us to improve our lives and increase our prosperity. The point of science is not to 
explore certain aspects of reality, but to generate useful knowledge. At this point, 
the educator will agree that educating the young does indeed require the learning 
such skills as the mastery of grammar, the art of reading, arithmetical tables, che-
mical formulae and other such things. But, adds the educator, such skills are not 
actually education, but merely one of its necessary preliminaries. 
The basic distinction, the educator will insist, is between education and trai-
ning. 
What we call „indoctrination“, as by totalitarian governments, is in fact a trai-
ning in making the supposedly right responses in the way we think. Governments 
are very keen on „training“ people because they often want to make them diffe-
rent - as the European Union does, for example, in trying (no doubt virtuously) to 
inculcate a sentiment of Europe-wide harmony and cooperation in all European 
countries. In this kind of ambition, education as the free play of the mind turns 
into a kind of industrial process, whose point is to make people the instruments 
of whatever supposedly virtuous aims authority has in mind. 
Again, a concern with schools and universities has in the last two generations 
given way to a public policy concerned with a single system of national instruc-
tion called „higher education“. This semantically destroys the distinctiveness of 
educational institutions such as universities by assimilating them to a miscellany 
of different kinds of instruction intended for many different purposes. It concei-
ves of education as a „system“ that can be manipulated by authority for whatever 
purposes are fashionable at the moment.
There is something dishonest about the rationalist „power vocabulary“ as it 
tries to subdue education to its own very different ambitions, and the easiest way 
to see this point is to pay attention to the misuse of words.  We must, says the 
rationalist (and the politician) „educate“ people to ...give up smoking, eat more 
healthily, transcend racial or religious prejudices, etc.   Virtuous these aims may 
often be; educational, they are certainly not, and the beginning of wisdom in this 
area is to have a clear sense of the difference between educational language and 
the vocabulary of power. It is by such devices that educational thoughtfulness 
is transposed semantically into the hard stuff of criticism, problem solving and 
indoctrination. 
Another aspect of practice in its rationalist form is the attempt to transpose 
the historical richness (and national variation) of educational institutions into 
arrangements that will more efﬁciently produce the consequences the politi-
cians want. Criticism converts the concrete realities of actual universities into an 
„essence.“ It will be clear, for example, that the famous universities of the world 
- Heidelberg and Tubingen, Oxbridge, Harvard and Yale and so on - have a certain 
cachet that comes from the fact that they have lots of money and are (among other 
things) haunts of the rich. But (runs the practical argument) surely the essence of 
a university is that it should be a place of pure intelligence. The only test should 
be academic merit. Should we not therefore recruit purely in terms of examina-
tions, dismissing from consideration as a reason for admitting a student the facts 
that the parents went to the College, that some people made notable donations 
etc? Just such pressures are being applied to universities all over the world, but 
they are by no means the only „reforms“ being foisted upon universities. Another 
practical policy is to bring the poor and the underprivileged into universities. And 
it is largely the power of governments that is turning independent institutions 
into instruments of political power. 
Why not, one might think? One reason is that teaching in universities is not 
the same thing as teaching in schools. In universities, the undergraduates must 
contribute their reason and their passions to what is going on, otherwise the spark 
(to use Plato‘s image) will not be transmitted. If the undergraduates lack the talent 
to respond to inquiry, the universities will be converted into training schools.  
But if we are concerned with a free society, we may also think that the cun-
ning of history was wise in locating many of the rich (such as Abelard himself) 
among the academic ranks. The young and poor tend above all to be concerned 
with „getting on“ in the world. They are highly responsive to signals that indica-
te where advantage is to be gained. They are, in other words, „careerists.“ Their 
conception of a society tends to be that of a set of pigeonholes, and the point of 
education, and indeed life, is to ﬁnd the best position. These are the young peo-
ple of our days who will soon be „looking for a job.“ But the traditional universi-
ty was full of people much more relaxed about careers and future jobs than the 
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young have recently become. No doubt many sought to make careers, but others 
were less utilitarian in their attitudes. Social pluralism may thus be understood 
as in itself a valuable contribution to academic autonomy. In other words, even a 
contingent feature of universities so evidently vulnerable to modiﬁcation in terms 
of rationalist practice may be understood as valuable in ways that are far from 
obvious to the casual eye. 
(6) Ultimately, the integrity and the vitality of universities depends on whe-
ther those who work in them understand exactly what makes them what they 
are. It is only if academics remain at a distance from the urgencies of practice 
that so fatally limit their creativity that education can play a real part in sustai-
ning a free society.
And we may illustrate this by referring to another episode in the history of 
universities. The early scientists in the late middle ages had trouble disengaging 
their practices from those of magic. Astronomy had to detach itself from astrolo-
gy, and chemistry was still haunted by alchemy until the late eighteenth centu-
ry. The Baconian research programme promised Europeans a future of increasing 
power and comfort that echoes the Faustian dream of power. It is a tribute to 
the vitality of the academic tradition that it could reject these ideas and survi-
ve such vulgar temptations. The interest of the early natural philosophers was 
in truth rather than power. The world of nature was recognised not as a system 
of secrets that could give men power, but as a complex interaction of states of 
affairs. And it was precisely in rejecting those illusions of power that modern sci-
ence became such an engine for the achievement of forms of power far beyond 
the circumscribed practical dreams of alchemists and astrologers. I take this as 
a parable about the nature of education: it thrives when it is free, and collapses 
when power tries to use it. 
Let me end by suggesting that the temptations of a magical attitude towards 
our power over nature constitute a recurring temptation for any civilisation, even 
ours. Magic is merely a dream of power, but it is a dream hard to resist when the 
simplicities of despotism tempt those who wield the centralised power of the 
modern nation-state, or the uncontrolled ambitions of the European Union. No 
educated person doubts that the talk of politicians is for the most part vulgar, 
repetitive and devious, and that the state represents a power that must be limited 
to the few things it can do well. The vitality of modern Europe depends on a dis-
dain for power rather than a submission to its demands.  We cannot avoid being 
involved in practical life, but we would be wise to recognise that practice is a kind 
of cognitive prison from which only education can release us.
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